To the rescue of Copenhagen interpretation by Salom, Igor
ar
X
iv
:1
80
9.
01
74
6v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
5 S
ep
 20
18
To the rescue of Copenhagen interpretation
Igor Salom
Institute of Physics, Belgrade
University, Pregrevica 118, Zemun, Serbia
A recent paper ”Single-world interpretations of quantum theory cannot be self-consistent” by
D. Frauchiger and R. Renner has attracted a considerable interest of a broader physics audience
and shortly elicited a number of replies. In spite of the objections that ensued, we find that sig-
nificant part of the controversial initial claim has not been refuted - on the contrary, arguments
presented both in the initial paper and in the replies seem to leave no longer room for the basic
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. We revisit the controversy trying to pinpoint
the exact phenomenon that lies in its core, pointing out to some aspects of the problem that seem
to have been mostly overlooked. Taking all conclusions into account, we here propose novel ways
to approach the ostensible paradox, in which the Copenhagen interpretation is naturally preserved.
Whereas arguments presented in Frauchiger and Renner paper and the replies that followed revolve
over whether Wigner’s friend would perceive only one or both of the possible outcomes, we offer
the third, pretty obvious solution - namely, that Wigner’s friend, in the well known setup, would
subjectively perceive none of the potentially conflicting outcomes. As a side note, we also argue
that, contrary to the often stated beliefs, hypothetical real experimental realization of Wigner’s
friend thought experiment actually would not provide us with any new insight into the quantum
mechanics.
I. INTRODUCTION
After perusing the sequence of papers initiated by arti-
cle [1] from D. Frauchiger and R. Renner, and followed up
by papers [2–4] of V. Baumann, S. Wolf, A. Sudbery and
A. Hansen, a careful reader is left under the impression
that a sort of silent mutiny has taken place in between of
the traversed lines. In spite of the certain aftertaste that
the main claims of the initial paper have been refuted
in the replies, after the dust has settled it seems that
the options left in the discussion actually no longer leave
any room for the ”standard” Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics (QM). And notwithstanding the
confronting presented arguments, our impression is that
these replies have just given a more solid ground at least
to a part of the controversial initial claim.
The paper [1] singles out one interpretation, i.e. many-
worlds (MW), as the correct one, claiming to present
arguments denying all the other available interpretations,
even the ”standard” Copenhagen interpretation (CI) of
quantum mechanics. And where the subsequent replies
successfully refute the main claim of uniqueness of the
many-world interpretation, they actually make the case
only worse for the CI. Namely, leaving aside (historical)
questions what the Copenhagen interpretation exactly
implies and no matter how vaguely it is defined, it is
certainly agreed that CI postulates two things:
I) unitary evolution of the system wave-function in be-
tween of the measurements;
II) wave-function collapses upon the measurement.
In addition to this, it is beyond dispute that CI sees
quantum mechanics as a complete theory, leaving no
room for hidden variable interpretations or formalisms.
However, as we inspect more closely below, interpreta-
tions (or formalisms, in the terminology of [3]) that ad-
here to both of these tenets seem to be effectively ruled
out by both proponents and the opponents of the paper
[1]. The attempt to refute CI as a possible interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics is unconcealed in the paper
[1], with its aims clearly stated already in the title. The
case for the CI is certainly not improved by the paper [4],
which advocates a variant of the De BroglieBohm (DBB)
interpretation (being a nonlocal hidden variable theory,
this view is at obvious odds with the CI). However, the
case is less clear, but not less so, with the papers [2]
and [3], which, at a first glance, tend to take no side of
any particular quantum mechanical interpretation in the
discussion, but try to merely refute or soften the strong
claims of the Frauchiger and Renner paper.
Yet, they essentially conclude that this paper [1] has
actually demonstrated the inconsistency of subjective
collapse theories, leaving just two options: ”objective
collapse” and ”no collapse” formalisms. Though these
two might seem not only mutually exclusive, but also as
exhausting all options, the type of ”objective collapse”
implied in this paper is such that it leaves no room for
CI. Namely, in the objective collapse cases considered,
subsystem consisting of Wigner’s friend [5] and the mea-
sured particle does not evolve unitarily, in spite of being
isolated. Such a collapse presupposes that the subsystem
evolves according to some, possibly yet unknown, form of
modified dynamics (non-hermitian Hamiltonian, explicit
nonlinearities, etc), which spontaneously and irrespec-
tive of any measurement takes the state of the system
into the new, collapsed state. Therefore, not only that
evolution is in this case non-unitary, but there is also no
true collapse in the sense of the additional postulate II
- the collapse instead appears only ”effectively”, induced
by the non-unitary evolution. This type of models, which
predict new physics and obviously depart both from I and
II (while postulate II can remain as an approximate rule)
we will call mechanical collapse models (GRW and Pen-
2rose attempts are the most known models of this sort).
We leave the notion of objective collapse models for a
wider class formalisms where collapse still exists (there
is neither practical nor ontological need to forever keep
the terms in the wave-function that turned to be incon-
sistent with measurements) and yet are not necessarily
of the mechanical collapse kind.
The other, ”no collapse” option, removes the collapse
postulate altogether. And no option seems to remain
that could comply with the foundational definition of
quantum mechanics, given by both I and II. A possibility
that the subjective collapse (where Baumann and Wolf
include also relational quantum mechanics [6], QBism [7]
and alike [8]) gives rise only to ”apparent paradox” and
yet not to a ”scientific” one is indeed analyzed in [3]. But
the final verdict was that the ”subjective collapse” in the
basic Wigner’s friend experiment with signaling seems
to lead to a measurable contradiction.1 Thus the silent
consensus of the papers is that quantum mechanics, in its
formulation from the first half of XX century, is, at least,
incomplete theory (the latter if we allow for the mechan-
ical collapse). And it is not only these papers: it is our
impression that prevailing opinion of fellow physicists is
becoming that either there is (objective) mechanical col-
lapse, or the many world interpretation alternative.
However, this is not the first time that the incomplete-
ness or incompetence of the standard form of QM was
suggested. All such attempts to prove logical inconsis-
tencies of QM in its basic form so far turned out to be
futile, with the most notable and famous example of the
EPR paradox paper. And often (like in the EPR case)
such attempts did instead shed some light to previously
less understood aspects of the quantum theory. We be-
lieve this could be also the case this time.
We next take a closer look at the arguments presented
in these papers, pointing to certain overlooked aspects,
after which we offer a third solution (or a third class of
solutions) - to our knowledge not clearly mentioned by
any of the established interpretations of QM. A solution
that we believe is in accordance with the Copenhagen
postulates and yet does not lead to contradictory pre-
dictions. It comes at the expense of further sacrificing
certain intuitive concepts that we unwarrantedly used to
take for granted (while we here maintain some other, dis-
puted by alternative attempts to preserve CI), but this
by now should not be a surprising feature of quantum
mechanics in general.
1 Under a proviso that information between Wigner and his friend
can be interchanged, which is in [3] questioned only in passing.
II. RECOUNTING THE ARGUMENTS AND
COUNTERARGUMENTS
A the core of the Frauchiger and Renner paper is a
cleverly devised setup that includes two ”observed ob-
servers” (aka Wigner’s friends). In spite that we certainly
praise the ingenious play of probabilities and logical im-
plications concocted in [1], we agree with the position
of [2, 3] that the essential paradoxical feature to which
Frauchiger and Renner point out is already present in the
basic Wigner’s friend thought experiment. (The more
complex setup of [1] merely demonstrates the same point
in a more drastic way). Therefore, we will mainly fo-
cus on the original Wigner’s friend experiment that was
again brought into the spotlight by this series of papers,
while only reflecting on the extended setup of [1] in the
end.
The idea of ”Wigner’s friend” type of (thought) ex-
periment is quite old, dating back at least to Wigner’s
1961 paper [5], though the same concept is found in the
printed long version of Everett’s thesis [10] which was,
purportedly in the same form, originally written back
in 1957. The well known thought experiment contains a
sentient observer - i.e. the ”Wigner’s friend” - performing
a measurement on a quantum system, while being ideally
(informationally) isolated in a sort of a box. After the
friend has done his2 measurement, another observer - i.e.
”Wigner” - has hypothetical ability to perform any quan-
tum measurement on the joint system in the box (that
comprises his friend and the initial quantum system that
was measured in the first place).3 If the two measure-
ments correspond to different bases of the initial quan-
tum system, the thought experiment leads to intricate
conclusions and superficial paradoxes.
Namely, let us, as usual, suppose that the initial sys-
tem is a particle of spin 1/2, prepared so that its spin is
aligned along x-axis:
|x+〉 = 1√
2
(|z+〉+ |z−〉), (1)
where |z+〉, |z−〉 denote states of spin projection equal
to 1/2, -1/2 along the z-axis. The Wigner’s friend mea-
sures the z projection of the spin. If we assume that the
wavepacket reduction (i.e. wavefunction collapse, mea-
surement update rule) has taken place, the system in the
box ends up either in a state |F+〉|z+〉, denoting the
Wigner’s friend who just saw the + outcome together
with the particle with the spin along the z axis, or in
the state |F−〉|z−〉, corresponding to the Wigner’s friend
2 Since we refer to the original Wigner’s argument, we will follow
the suit and address the friend in masculine gender. Besides, the
experiment itself does not seem to be very safe for the Wigner’s
friend, so we find it unsuitable to assign that role to a lady.
3 This ability is sometimes called ”the full quantum control”, i.e.
it is said that ”Wigner has the full quantum control over the
system in the box”.
3who has measured the negative spin projection and the
particle that is aligned accordingly. However, from the
Wigner’s perspective, all that is in the box is, at some
level, just a extremely complex but isolated quantum sys-
tem that, according the to rules of quantum mechanics,
has to evolve unitarily, and the measurement act of his
friend could result in no more than a mere entanglement
of the state of his friend with the particle spin state.
From his perspective thus the system must be in the su-
perposition:
|W+〉 = 1√
2
(|F+〉|z+〉+ |F−〉|z−〉), (2)
where |F±〉 is the state of the friend having observed ±
(any apparatus that he had to use for the measurement
is seen simply as an extension of the Wigner’s friend him-
self, and its state is included in |F±〉). To make the dif-
ference objectively manifest, we assume that Wigner can
perform the measurement on his friend and the particle in
the basis {|W+〉 = 1√
2
(|F+〉|z+〉 + |F−〉|z−〉),|W−〉 =
1√
2
(|F+〉|z+〉 − |F−〉|z−〉)}. Then, if the friend is in
either of the collapsed states, he will equally likely ob-
tain |W+〉 and |W−〉 outcomes, whereas if the evolution
inside the box was indeed unitary, then the chance of
obtaining |W−〉 result is in principle exactly zero.
The essence of the paper [1] argument translates (over-
simplifiedly, we admit) in this case to the observation
that a way to reconcile these conflicting viewpoints (the
only way, according to the authors) is to accept that both
outcomes of the Wigner friend’s experiment are equally
(ontologically) real, i.e. that the friend must have both
observed |z+〉 result and observed |z−〉 result, each in
the corresponding ”world” of the many-worlds interpre-
tation.
The criticism of the [2] and [3] papers points out that
the above argument inconsistently uses the ”collapse pos-
tulate” of quantum mechanics while these authors make
distinction between, according to them, altogether three
possibilities:
1) The collapse is objective and objectively happens
after the first measurement (or in its course) and thus
Wigner has no reason to expect to see the interference
result (i.e. to observe no |W−〉 occurrence). Indeed, ex-
perimentally Wigner would then measure both |W+〉 and
|W−〉 outcomes with equal probability and there would
be nothing paradoxical at all;
2) The collapse does not happen at all, which is the
conclusion Frauchiger and Renner in [1] are seeking to
derive, albeit this possibility is thus no longer the only
one;
3) The collapse is ”subjective”, which corresponds
to the above difference in measurement predictions of
Wigner and his friend and thus, the authors agree, even-
tually leads to certain inconsistencies, so it is the pos-
sibility that can be, with some caution, refuted in this
way.
As the consistent possibilities remain, according to [2,
3], both 1 and 2, which are observationally different in
principle (rendering these two different ”formalisms” and
not different ”interpretations”, as the authors rightfully
insist).
The authors of [4], on the other hand, point to a
generalized version of DBB interpretation as an explicit
counter example for the [1] conclusions. In the terminol-
ogy of the options 1,2 and 3, which are exhaustive accord-
ing to the authors of [2] and [3], this counter-example, in
spite of not being the ”many-world” interpretation, still
fits into the second class of ”no collapse” formalisms. (As
some critics of the De BroglieBohm interpretations would
say, DBB can be seen as many-world interpretation ”with
a pointer”.) The flaw in the reasoning of paper [1] that
allows for the counter example presented in [4] is the fact
that Wigner’s friend type of arguments can be used only
as the motivation for giving up the collapse postulate.
This leaves room not only for the ”many worlds” inter-
pretation, as the authors of [1] tend to conclude, but at
least also for the more general original Everet’s ”relative
state” interpretation and the Bell’s pilot wave interpre-
tation of [4].
But, in all this discussion, where is the Copenhagen
Interpretation? V. Baumann, A. Hansen and S. Wolf
are notably surprised in [2] to find that the authors of
the paper [1] have identified the ”standard interpreta-
tion” of quantum mechanics with the ”subjective collapse
model”, i.e. with the option 3, which, as all of them agree,
does indeed lead to inconsistencies. In turn, they refrain
from explicitly specifying which interpretation they con-
sider as the ”standard one”, maybe simply in avoiding to
assume any precedence or prevalence among interpreta-
tions. Nevertheless, we still take that by the ”standard
interpretation” all parties must consider what is more of-
ten called the Copenhagen interpretation (CI), as this is
the only thing that can deserve such a title.
On the other hand, in the introductory section of [3]
authors announce they will treat ”the standard quantum
mechanics” as having different experimental predictions
from the many-world approach in the case of encapsu-
lated observers. In the context of their analysis, it then
seems clear that the authors take the standard quan-
tum mechanics to be one of the mechanical-collapse type,
which we find unusual. In any case, CI obviously is not
of the mechanical-collapse type, nor of the no-collapse
type, and thus we are left under impression that CI is
definitely disputed as a valid interpretation/formalism of
quantum mechanics.
III. THE ROOT OF THE PARADOX
Let us take a closer look to where such a strong state-
ment - as refuting of the CI certainly is - actually stems
from. To this end, we will first consider a simplified ver-
sion of the thought experiment, where Wigner’s friend is
replaced by a vastly simpler quantum system, e.g. with a
single photon (we will not use another spin 1/2 particle
to avoid confusion). Let a measuring device contained in
4the box produce a vertically aligned photon if the z-axis
spin measurement outcome is +1/2, and let the polariza-
tion be horizontal otherwise. More precisely, and to be
more in line with the photon mimicking Wigner’s friend,
let the photon be pre-existing, e.g. in vertically polarized
state, with its state only switched to horizontal by the
measuring device in the case of -1/2 outcome.
In this version, the Wigner’s thought experiment is far
less mysterious. Before the ”measurement”, the state of
the ”photon friend” together with the spin 1/2 particle
is:
|ψ0〉 = |V 〉|x+〉 = 1√
2
|V 〉(|z+〉+ |z−〉),
whereas after the measurement which, in this case with-
out doubt, has merely introduced the entanglement, we
have:
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|V 〉|z+〉+ |H〉|z−〉). (3)
Of course, we could above explicitly include the state of
the apparatus/isolated environment, but the supposition
is that these would simply factor out, and thus effectively
change nothing of the analysis.
Once Wigner opens the box and measures the sys-
tem in the W+/W- basis (here: |W+〉 = 1√
2
(|V 〉|z+〉 +
|H〉|z−〉), |W−〉 = 1√
2
(|V 〉|z+〉 − |H〉|z−〉), there is no
doubt that onlyW+ outcome would be possible. Such an
experiment (or some variant of) is even practically feasi-
ble. Furthermore, there is no formalism or interpretation
of quantum mechanics that would have trouble to explain
such an outcome (otherwise, it could hardly qualify as a
formalism/interpretation). Thus, there is no paradox on
this level.
Let us also note the following: if Wigner, after opening
the box and after his W+/W- measurement, decides to
subsequently also measure the photon friend ”memory”
state (i.e. if he measures the polarization in the H/V
basis) it is clear that he will obtain either vertical or hor-
izontal polarization, with equal probabilities. The spin
of the particle will, of course, become oriented in accor-
dance with the photon polarization: up in the case of
vertical polarization and down otherwise. However, this
particular outcome tells us nothing about the particle
spin alignment prior to this measurement of the photon
in the H/V basis, and thus nothing about the spin ori-
entation before W+/W- measurement and before open-
ing of the box. This holds irrespectively of whether the
H/V measurement was performed by Wigner on purpose,
or it somehow effectively took place due to decoherence
(supposing the environment for any reason prefers H/V
basis). This conclusion, though obvious in the case of the
photon friend, will be important to remember when we
return to the human Wigner assistant.
Now, let us gradually increase the complexity of
Wigner’s friend and carefully note when the controversy
occurs.
If we replace Wigner friend with couple of correlated
photons/particles (e.g. with |V 〉|V 〉|V 〉|V 〉 encoding z+
outcome and |H〉|H〉|H〉|H〉 encoding z-), nothing is ex-
pected to change. However, as the number of particles
playing the role of Wigner’s friend grow, models that
predict existence of mechanical-objective collapse will
generally diverge in predictions from models that imply
universal validity of quantum mechanics in its standard
form (based on postulates I and II). At some point non-
linear/nonunitary dynamics that such models by defini-
tion have to predict must kick in and result in objec-
tive breakdown of the superposition of macroscopic states
corresponding to the two outcomes. Whichever mech-
anism is responsible for such effective decoherence (i.e.
mechanical-objective collapse) it is quite certain that its
effect would have to become observable (via appearance
of non-zero probability of W- outcome in W+/W- mea-
surement) already on much lesser complexity scale than
it is the complexity of a human Wigner’s friend. Even
in a far-fetched hypothesis that consciousness somehow
objectively induces the collapse, it is hard to conceive
such a nonunitary evolution that would require exactly
human consciousness for the feat. On the contrary, it is
more than plausible that the same physically-measurable
effect could be then, at least partially, induced also by
mind/brain of some animal, insect, by some key part of
an (animal) brain organ, or even to some extent by a
single neuron.
In other words, while the mechanical collapse models
(or formalisms, as called in [3]) would predict break-down
of orthodox quantum predictions somewhere along the
road from the single photon Wigner friend to the human
Wigner friend, it certainly would not take actual exper-
iment with humans to prove or disprove mechanical col-
lapse theories. If much simpler experiments than these
would not reveal hints of objective collapse, we could
be pretty confident to abandon such models long before
we are capable to perform literal Wigner’s friend experi-
ment. On the other hand, if mechanical collapse models
are right, we would anyhow find it out by more feasible
experiments much sooner than we become technically ca-
pable to perform the exact Wigner’s friend experiment.
Thus, having or not ability to actually perform Wigner’s
friend experiment does not influence our ability to tell
apart mechanical collapse models from the rest. Likely,
we will later argue that actualization of this experiment
is not, contrary to often stated beliefs, necessary for gain-
ing any new understanding of quantum mechanics.
In any case, objective collapse models imply existence
of new physics, are obviously experimentally distinguish-
able from the standard quantum mechanics (postulates
I and II) and are not the topic of this analysis. Our
primary goal is to see if and how Wigner’s friend experi-
ment can invalidate Copenhagen formulation of quantum
mechanics.
But, from the view of Copenhagen interpretation,
adding new particles and increasing complexity of the
Wigner’s photon friend should not essentially change
5anything, thus the W- outcome must be as impossible
with a human-like complexity of Wigner’s friend appa-
ratus as it was in the case of the photon friend. And,
if there was no conceptual problem with a single photon
friend it is a very intricate question how and at which
point any paradox can arise as the this complexity grows.
In particular, it is obviously essential to pinpoint which
is that key element that introduces such a qualitative
twist - from no problem at all, to a paradox as deep as
to shake the foundations of quantum mechanics. It is
hard to imagine how any analysis of this experiment can
be carried out while glossing over this question - and yet
this seems to be the case with basically all of the papers
from this series.
According to [3], hint of this key element is noncha-
lantly given in parentheses at the end of the third sec-
tion, where it is implied that Wigner’s friend must be a
”thinking (or computing) entity”, as it must be capable
to calculate and predict probability for Wigner to obtain
result W-. While the word thinking evades easy tech-
nical definition and thus cannot really help us here, the
word ”computing” has much more clear meaning. It is
basically defined4 as an algorithm that performs a ”cal-
culation”, which is in turn a ”process that transforms
one or more inputs into one or more results”. However,
what is the exactly the algorithm that should calculate
probability of W-, and, more importantly, what are the
inputs for such a calculation?
The only relevant objective input we have is whether
the objective part of the measurement has taken place
or not. And, unless something malfunctioned in the ap-
paratus, the ”objective part of the measurement” - i.e.
the process of establishing a correlation between mea-
surement outcome register and the particle spin being
measured - will certainly have taken place. As we are
not interested in malfunctioning apparatus, we realize
that the input ”whether the measurement has objectively
taken place or not” is always true (or 1). Yet, the always
constant input is as good as no input at all. Without
variable input, i.e. with constant input, the only possible
algorithm outcome can be also a beforehand given, pre-
set constant, sealed by the implemented preprogrammed
algorithm. Thus, we must implement from the start, as
a constant, our prediction what the probability of W-
outcome will be, either 0 or 1/2. It is just as good as if
we add another bit of information, e.g. another photon
to our photon friend, but this additional one will sim-
ply be constant from start till the end of the experiment.
Can adding of another, noncorelated photon in the plot
bring about any paradox - certainly not! To conclude -
increasing complexity of Wigner’s friend to the level of a
”computing entity” is not sufficient per se to introduce,
even less demonstrate any paradox.
So, does the fact that universal quantum mechanic
4 E.g. follow Wikipedia definition.
(contrasted to hypothetical mechanical collapse models)
definitely predicts zero probability for W- outcome, and
the fact that there is nothing objectively paradoxical
with that means that there are no problems and poten-
tial paradoxes at all? Definitely not. However, we must
recognize that the seemingly paradoxical situation arises
only when we include subjective aspect in the picture.
Indeed, the problem arises only when and if we take
into account that Wigner’s friend subjectively perceives
only one measurement outcome, either z+ or z-. Let us
revise the original experiment taking account of both its
”objective” and ”subjective” aspects.
First, let us recount what objectively (by which we
here actually mean subjectively from Wigner’s perspec-
tive) must take place in this type of experiment. At some
initial time t0, Wigner’s friend is, together with appara-
tus and the particle with spin along x axis, encapsulated
in that isolated environment, i.e. the box. The corre-
sponding state of the Wigner’s friend with the particle is
given with:
|ψ0〉 = 1√
2
|F0〉(|z+〉+ |z−〉). (4)
At some moment t1 the measurement, i.e. establishing
of the correlation, takes place inside the box, bringing
the state to the form:
|ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|F1+〉|z+〉+ |F1−〉|z−〉). (5)
Here |F1±〉 denotes the state of Wigner’s friend at time
t1 that has just registered outcome ±. At some later
moment t2, the system is in the state:
|ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|F2+〉|z+〉+ |F2−〉|z−〉), (6)
when Wigner carefully performs the delicate interfer-
ence demonstration experiment, measuring the combined
friend+particle state in the basis W + /W− (where
|W+〉 = |ψ2〉 = 1√
2
(|F2+〉|z+〉+|F2−〉|z−〉) and |W−〉 =
1√
2
(|F2+〉|z+〉 − |F2−〉|z−〉) ). Here |F2±〉 denotes the
state of Wigner’s friend evolved to the time t2, with all
corresponding memories and perceptions of someone who
had measured spin projection ± 1
2
at time t1. Necessar-
ily, Wigner obtains W+ outcome with certainty, thus not
altering the state of the combined system at all! Sooner
or later after that, at some time t3, Wigner’s friend is
finally allowed to leave the box, interact with global
(i.e. Wigner’s) environment and, either by telling Wigner
about his experience or, more likely, by some decoherence
mechanisms before that, he is effectively measured in the
basis F3 + /F3−. The outcome is either F3+ and the
overall new state:
|ψ3〉 = |F3+〉|z+〉, (7)
which is the friend at t3 knowing that he measured spin
projection +1/2 at time t1, accompanied with the spin
6vertically aligned, or F3− and the state:
|ψ3〉 = |F3−〉|z−〉, (8)
that denotes him knowing that he measured projection
-1/2 at t1, while the particle has negative spin projec-
tion. Both outcomes come with equal probabilities of
1/2. This is exactly the same as the subsequent measure-
ment of the photon friend polarization that we discussed
earlier, which, in spite of the correlated state, does not
really mean that particle spin had a well defined projec-
tion along z axis at time t1. Therefore, no matter that
Wigner’s friend can clearly recollect himself measuring
the spin and getting a very definite result at t1, even be-
ing able to specify that result, this pose no contradiction
whatsoever, since this result does not mean that z pro-
jections of the spin (and of Wigner’s friend) was truly
defined until the moment t3.
We are surprised to note that all considered analyses
of the Wigner’s friend type measurement ignored to take
into account the decoherence moment t3, obviously find-
ing it inessential. On the contrary, in our viewpoint this
element will turn out to play the crucial role.
Anyhow, above we concluded that the standard quan-
tum mechanics predicts that Wigner will certainly obtain
W- result, while his friend at t3 will nevertheless be able
to attest that he obtained a definite result of the z spin
component at the exact time t1, and will be able to spec-
ify that result. As the matter in fact, we remind again
that Wigner’s interference measurement (in principle at
least) did not alter the state of his friend at all (nor of
the particle spin), so that the friend will have the same
subjective observations and impressions as if there was
no Wigner’s meddling at all: just as if he simply mea-
sured the spin at t1 and just left the insulating box at
t3. If the Wigner had ability to perform the interference
measurement without his friends knowledge (e.g. during
his sleep) the friend would have no way to find out if
the measurement was performed or not. But, knowing
about the interference measurement and of the outcome
probabilities, from the friend’s viewpoint there seems to
be something wrong with quantum mechanics: he vividly
remembers to have measured the z spin projection and
obtained the definite result z+ (or it could have been z-)
at time t1, which means that both his state and the spin
state should have collapsed accordingly. In turn, this
implies that Wigner should have had 50-50 chances of
getting either W+ or W-, but this is not what happens.
And yet, this predicted confusion of the friend is fair and
square in line with idea of universality of quantum me-
chanics, and there is nothing truly paradoxical in this
account of the events. Interpretations respecting univer-
sality of unitary evolution (including CI, MW, DBB etc)
thus predict that Wigner’s friend must be puzzled if he
considers events solely from his point of view, and that
there is nothing really quantum-mechanically surprising,
unexpected or even less contradictory about this.
To get any contradiction, we must ask what did the
Wigner’s friend subjectively experience at the moment
t1, or in between of t1 and t2. For, if he had subjectively
perceived a single outcome at t1, e.g. spin up, then he
must have been entitled to apply the measurement up-
date rule - i.e. to conclude that in the reality the spin
was from then on oriented only positively along z axis
- and thus to erroneously conclude that Wigner must
have equal probability to measure W- as the probabil-
ity to measure W+. The ”single-spin-orientation” real-
ity that Wigner’s friend perceives at t1 is then, at least
in some sense, in contradiction with the ”superposed-
spin-orientation” reality that Wigner confirms in the in-
terference experiment (why these two ”realities” cannot
coexist is in detail explained in [8]). And, on the other
hand, we do know that he must have perceived a sin-
gle outcome, since our subjective experience seems not
be capable to be in superposition. Alternatively, if the
friend is not allowed to use the collapse postulate (II),
upon clearly perceiving a single measurement outcome -
then it is very unclear who can claim that right, and we
must conclude that the postulate is altogether pointless
and that it should be discarded.
Actually, we can pinpoint the source of the paradox
even further. On one side, we assume that Wigner’s
friend can be considered as a quantum-mechanical mech-
anism/device undergoing a unitary evolution. His brain
is then essentially similar to a quantum computer (or any-
thing more complex but nevertheless following the law of
unitary evolution). Since we consider the friend jointly
with his sealed environment, there is no true decoherence
and the evolution is entirely unitary - there is no phys-
ical cause for any wave-function collapse (we have put
the mechanical-collapse models aside). Next, we imply
that such quantum-unitary brain-device gives rise to the
subjective experience. Finally we attribute a novel ca-
pacity to this subjective experience: to effectively break
down the superposition by ”experiencing” only one of
the superposed states that form the state of the parent
brain-device (in some predefined basis). In other words,
we expect it to induce the collapse of the wave function,
in spite of the unitary nature of the mechanism that pro-
duces it. This does not seem mathematically reasonable
and no wonder that this results in paradoxes. On the
other hand, we cannot help to do so, and we do it with a
good reason: in our subjective experience we always per-
ceive well defined measurement outcomes, and concept
of superposed outcomes seems utterly impossible. Al-
ternatively, if we deny occurrence of the collapse even in
this stage (and try to reinterpret subjective experience as
do proponents of the many-worlds interpretation), then
we must part with the postulate (II) and also with the
Copenhagen interpretation.
Due to negligence of this point, essential in our view,
in the most discussions on the subject, we feel an urge
to emphasize it even more: to get any paradoxical fea-
ture it is absolutely essential to take into account subjec-
tive experience and not mere intelligence (i.e. reasoning,
7ability to perform computations, etc.).5 Nowadays, it
is easy to imagine an artificially intelligent either clas-
sical or quantum computer that could mimic to some
extent behaviour of the Wigner’s friend. Based on the
measured spin projection (and possibly some other in-
put), this computer could produce the same output that
the friend would produce, regardless of the output com-
plexity (e.g. later account of the events, any elaborate
messages issued before or after the interference measure-
ment and alike). However, if resulting in a well defined
output when provided a well defined input, then given a
superposition of two spin outcomes the computer would
necessarily end in the state which is a superposition of
the corresponding outputs. (Since the environment is in-
formationally isolated, this will also hold for the system
of classical computer+enviroment, not only for a quan-
tum computer). This is maybe more intuitive now than
in the case with the Wigner’s friend, though no differ-
ent. Consequently, it maybe more intuitive that nothing
objectively paradoxical can occur here. It is only if we as-
sume existence of subjective experience of this computer
(similar to that of a human) and question what it per-
ceives as the result of the spin measurement, that we can
run into weird or contradictory conclusions. Note that
we neither claim that such a computer would posses sub-
jective experience nor that it would not - we just stress
that without it, there is no paradox at all.
Can we simply ignore existence of subjective experi-
ence, as it is not necessary to explain any objective be-
haviour? We doubt so. In spite that the mere existence of
subjective experience is almost certainly not objectively
provable (we direct reader to extensive literature on re-
lation of Turing test with subjective experience, and the
related long standing debates), it is nonetheless an ex-
perimental fact, which every one of us can immediately
experimentally confirm (ignoring this would be equal to
resorting to solipsism). Likely, it does not change any-
thing if we claim that subjective experience is some sort
of illusion - in that case the existence of the illusion is
experimental fact that must be taken into account.
A number of solutions to this contradictory situation
was offered in the literature. Maybe the most obvious
one, that sparked the whole discussion in [1] by the claim
that it is the only possible one, is the option to indeed
discard the collapse postulate and claim that, in spite
of the fact that Wigner friend can perceive only a sin-
gle outcome, there are two copies of the friend in differ-
ent branches of the many-world, each seeing a different
spin orientation. Similarly, the DBB variant discussed in
[4] also abandons the collapse postulate. Alternatively,
QBists take a sort of agnostic view on this matter, claim-
ing that ”to provide one agent the ability to conceptually
pierce the other agents personal experience” by definition
5 It is not rare that these two concepts are confused, although it
is not clear if and how much they have in common at all.
should be out of the scope of quantum mechanics (which
is in turn understood as ”gambling manual” for estimat-
ing outcome probabilities from personal point of view)
[7]. Instead of simply staying silent on the question of
the friend’s perceptions, but to us conceptually not far
from it, one can give up the idea of single factual reality,
i.e. of objectivity of the ”facts of the world” - imply-
ing that facts can exist only relative to an observer (or
reference frame) [8]. In this view, a statement, e.g. an ob-
servation about a measurement outcome of some agent,
that is true for one observer is not necessarily such for
the other. According to Brukner in [8], this approach
is a way to deal with the question of friend’s measure-
ment outcome within CI: ”Copenhagenist (can) take the
position that there are no facts of the world per se, but
only relative to observers”. In [9] he further builds upon
this view, turning it into a no-go theorem that effectively
posits the denying of the ”facts of the world” as the only
way out for the Copenhagen interpretation.
For this reason, we will analyse a bit more closely the
treatment of the Wigner’s friend experiment exposed in
the papers [8, 9]. This approach allows that the reali-
ties of different observers can be even contradicting each
other in certain sense. More precisely, it finds legit for
an interpretation (and sees the CI as such) to negate
the forth postulate of the no-go theorem in [9], the one
which states: ”One can jointly assign truth values to the
propositions about observed outcomes (”facts”) of dif-
ferent observers”. In this particular case, it means that
in spite of the fact that Wigner’s friend obtained a well
defined and single outcome of the spin measurement, his
conclusion about the spin property is not necessarily true
from the Wigner’s information-reference frame. Though
fascinating possibility as it is, this is an unusual and rel-
atively high price we have to pay in the ontological and
philosophical sense - to give up notions of the general sci-
entific truth and facts, ideas which we thought are well
defined and understood. Of course, this can be easily
dismissed as an aesthetical complaint, which we agree it
is.
However, Baumann and Wolf in [3] argue that ap-
proach in [8] still possibly yields what they deem as in-
admissible ”scientific contradiction” in the case of the
Wigner’s friend experiment. Basically, they point out
that not only the friend can calculate the probability of
Wigner measuring W- outcome and obtain a different re-
sult from Wigner (which would be ok because realities of
different informational-reference systems cannot be com-
pared), but also he can communicate these conclusions to
the Wigner - which, if we correctly interpret, gives rise to
what they call ”scientific contradiction”. In our opinion,
the incompatibility of Wigner’s and friend’s predictions is
not necessarily detrimental per se. As the matter in fact,
we have already pointed out that all unitarity-respecting
formalisms of quantum mechanics predict that Wigner’s
friend would have to conclude the probabilities of the in-
terference measurement outcomes to be 50-50 percent,
as long as he is judging solely from his own perspective.
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of an obstacle in this case, is the insistence of Brukner
in [8] on the complete symmetry between the observers
- something we do not find fully appropriate and neces-
sary in the particular given setup (since, as we have seen,
only one of them here will be mistaken if considers the
collapse and the events solely from his perspective).
Finally and most importantly from our viewpoint, it
is not clear (or at least not clarified in [8]) what is the
relation of the spin projection result the friend obtains
(from his reference system) at t1, and the potentially new
outcome that the friend later remembers, decided at t3?
If these results coincide, then both Wigner and his friend
later know what was the z spin projection at t1, in spite
of the interference demonstrated at t3. Brukner, on the
other hand, goes in length in [8] to explain that this can-
not be so. Besides, why would this be different from
the case of the ”photon friend” where we concluded that
subsequential measurement in H/V basis would not re-
veal electron spin projection as it was at t1, but only as it
became at t3 (the opposite would radically contradict our
usual understanding of quantum mechanics, and run into
various inconsistencies). Even more strangely, if the final
result stored in the friend’s memory is not correlated with
the one obtained at t1, and could be in principle a dif-
ferent one, then why and at which point this flip occurs?
We stress again that Wigner’s interference measurement
did not alter the friend+spin system in any way, so it
is hard to see this as the cause of the flip. Not imply-
ing that these points disqualify the above interpretation
as a viable explanation of the Wigner’s thought experi-
ment, some readers may find it to be a shaky argument
for the CI case and difficult to take the solace from the
author’s claim that this is the only way to reconcile CI
with Wigner’s gedanken experiment. In this regard, we
find that possible additional interpretations supporting
CI would be quite welcome.
Indeed, now that we have pinpointed the root of the
Wigner’s friend paradox to be inseparable from the phe-
nomenon of subjective experience, which is in turn a con-
cept even less understood than the foundations of quan-
tum mechanics, we have opened a door to new under-
standing of implications of the Wigner’s friend experi-
ment.
IV. SUBJECTIVE COLLAPSE IS SUBJECTIVE
We believe that a resolution much more in line with the
spirit of quantum mechanics, which follows the basic CI,
has been overlooked due to implicit unnecessary assump-
tions made in the reasoning from the previous section.
Namely, it is the possibility that, from the Wigner’s per-
spective, the problematic friend’s subjective perception of
spin measurement at t1 simply did not exist prior to t3!
Actually, all we need in order to get there is to stead-
fastly follow the CI. All basic CI standard concepts and
postulates can remain as they are: there is a single re-
ality and there are universal facts of the world. The
evolution is unitary, apart from the moments of collapse
that coincide with those of measurement (measurement
in a broader sense). In the terminology of [2, 3], the mea-
surement postulate is applied according to what the au-
thors call ”subjective collapse interpretation”. However,
it must be done consistently, which, in our opinion, none
of the papers [1–3] does. Namely, all that Wigner’s friend
needs to do to get his predictions right is to refrain from
attributing his ”subjective” collapse to other observers
(i.e. to Wigner). If he wants to infer the outcome of
Wigner’s experiment, he may, but he must look from the
Wigner’s perspective - and from that perspective there
is no any collapse and the evolution of the system in the
box is unitary. In that case, he would correctly calculate
that the probability of W- interference outcome is zero.
The friend is entitled to consider from his own perspec-
tive - which includes collapse - only subjective outcomes
of his own measurements. He can predict that at t1 he is
going to measure the particle spin projection, and that
he will observe a single outcome of two possibilities, with
probabilities 1/2. And indeed, as we have shown, that
is exactly what happens from his perspective according
to all interpretations/formalism of quantum mechanics
which respect the universal unitarity. If he follows the
CI rules consistently in this way, both him and Wigner
will get all the predictions right, and there will be no
”scientific contradiction” at all. It only makes sense to
call such a consistent application of subjective collapse
the ”subjective collapse” interpretation.
In this account of the events, we have basically literally
followed the standard postulates of quantum mechanics.
The only assumptions we must adjust in this approach
are actually not related to physics, but to our under-
standing of the phenomenon of subjective experience (i.e.
of consciousness). The part that runs against our usual
intuitive assumptions is answering, from the Wigner’s
point of view, the question ”what does the friend sub-
jectively perceive in between t1 and t2?”
This question can be answered in multiple ways, each
defining a particular variant, or a ”sub-interpretation”,
of the ”subjective collapse” interpretation (while the lat-
ter we see only as a natural reading of CI). The first, and
a quite obvious one that we have already announced, is
to accept that simply there was not any such friend’s
subjective perception in the period from t1 to t2 from
the Wigner’s aspect. Indeed, there is no any trace in the
universe that such subjective perception ever existed. As
we have already discussed, in the end the friend does have
clear recollection of the events during and after the mea-
surement, but the content of these memories was deter-
mined at the moment t3. Even if subjective perceptions
of a single outcome could be ascribed to the Wigner’s
friend at the time t1, the corresponding memories would
be erased by the interference measurement at t2 and the
memories - but possibly of a different outcome - would
again appear after the decoherence at t3. So, whatever
Wigner’s friend tells us after the measurement, it has
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and t2. There is no any proof that his perception existed
in this period (later we will address the potential problem
of signaling). And, we have learnt in quantum mechan-
ics that most often one should not assign definite reality
to events/things of which exists no account/information.
In addition, it is exactly this subjective perception that
seems to cause the conflict with the standard postulates
of quantum mechanics. Why is it then so widely implied
that Wigner’s friend must posses subjective perception
from Wigner’s viewpoint even in between of t1 and t2?
We believe that the main reason why the other op-
tion has not been analysed at all (to our knowledge) is
a combined effect of two assumptions that are tacitly
taken for granted in this context. The first assumption is
that the subjective perception is a mere product of brain
functioning. In truth, while the correlation of the brain
functions and the subjective perception (consciousness)
is beyond any doubt, whether the subjective experience
can be explained solely as the emergent phenomenon of
the biological computations taking place in the brain - is
much of an open question in cognitive science and phi-
losophy of consciousness. Not only that the Wigner’s
friend discussion in the literature tend to, without say-
ing, imply positive answer to this long standing ques-
tion, but authors go even a step further: seemingly in-
advertently, without saying or commenting, they imply
that subjective experience must also emerge from and
directly accompany even a ”potential” state of a brain
- i.e. a brain state that exists in a superposition. But,
the latter assumption is so strong and far from being
obviously warranted that even accepted DBB interpreta-
tion of quantum mechanics already does not adhere to
it: unlike the many-worlds interpretation which assumes
that any branch that contains a state of some operational
brain also lends existence to subjective experience of the
brain owner, for DBB interpretation wavefunction of the
brain is not enough to yield subjective perception - only
the ”branch” filled with ”actual particles” somehow pro-
duces subjective experience.
Thus, one way to understand the absence of friend’s
subjective experience (from Wigner’s perspective) in the
period from t1 to t2, is to accept that subjective experi-
ence pertains only to actualized reality - i.e. corresponds
to collapsed states (and in this sense to classical infor-
mation). ”Undecided” or potential reality in such view
does not give rise to subjective perception. That is, from
Wigner’s perspective, his friend’s subjective perception
becomes defined and thus real and existent only at the
moment t3, i.e. at the moment when his brain state also
gets defined (collapsed). And when it gets defined at t3,
it contains all the memories and experiences pertaining
to period from t1 to t2 that his friend will feel (and tell
about) as if they happened not at t3, but from t1 to t2
(we stress once more that this conclusion about friend’s
recount of the events is shared by all unitarity obeying
formalisms). Nevertheless, before t3, while the friend’s
brain is from Wigner’s perspective in superposition re-
garding that part of experience from t1 to t2, there is sim-
ply no corresponding experience yet. In this very sense,
and in contrast to the Wigner’s ”consciousness causes
collapse”, this view can be dubbed as ”collapse causes
consciousness”.
Another possible way to understand why and how
there can be no Wigner’s friend experience in between
t1 and t2 from Wigner’s aspect, is to accept that from
this perspective his friend just does not have subjective
experience at all. Not only from t1 to t2, but never. Such
a view could be dubbed as ”no objective consciousness”
interpretation. In other words, the subjectiveness of sub-
jective experience should be taken to such an extent that
not only it makes no sense for Wigner to speak or discuss
his friend’s subjective perceptions, but that he somehow
must not assume their existence at all. In this view, sub-
jective experience can exist only as subjective, and all the
problems arise from in-principle wrong attempts to ob-
jectivise subjective perception. To grasp the full meaning
and implications of this statement - if possible - lies be-
yond the scope of this paper. However, we must note that
such a (somewhat radical) conclusion would also provide
a curious explanation of (or at least an unexpected con-
nection to) the long standing problem in the philosophy
of consciousness, known as the ”problem of other minds”
(related to what seems to be inability in principle to infer
whether or not a given entity/agent possesses subjective
experience). From the observational point there are cer-
tainly no paradoxes nor conflicts at all - the situation is
symmetric from the viewpoint of any of the observers,
and each of them can correctly calculate outcome prob-
abilities of any measurement (of course, each time it is
necessary to take the corresponding viewpoint). In ad-
dition, lack of subjective experience of his friend from
the Wigner’s perspective certainly does not prevent his
friend to act sensible in every aspect - in the very root of
the ”problem of other minds” is the fact (or at least the
hardly disprovable assumption) that subjective experi-
ence is not a necessary prerequisite for anyone’s objective
behaviour.
There is another approach, at least superficially dif-
ferent, to answer the question of ”what does the friend
subjectively perceive in between t1 and t2?”. This one
requires to tweak a bit further our understanding of time,
and of its relativity. Instead of the variant in which
Wigner denies existence of his friend’s subjective expe-
riences in between t1 and t2, in this view he is actually
able to assign well defined perceptions to the friend in
this period - but the perceptions related to the outcome
that is defined at t3! That is, Wigner may conclude that
during the period from t1 to t2 his friend, at each corre-
sponding moment, is currently living through experience
in which he has just seen a well defined spin measure-
ment outcome and is pondering, at any given moment,
its value in his mind. But this outcome that he perceived
is not the one that corresponds to actual spin alignment
at t1, it is instead the result that will be defined only at
t3. In other words, in this view he sees the result that
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will be determined in the future! The advantage of this
”perception of future” perspective is that the Wigner’s
account of temporal evolution of his friend’s subjective
experience can match what his friend later recounts of the
subjectively experienced past (i.e. these two viewpoints
become synchronized).
Nevertheless, shouldn’t this be inconsistent, even
ridiculous? Surprisingly, it does not seem so. It could
potentially lead to paradoxes if the friend would be able
to communicate the result he perceived ”from the fu-
ture”. However, at the very moment he manages to send
this information outside of his sealed environment, his
superposition from the Wigner’s point of view will col-
lapse and the information becomes that of the spin at
t1.
6
Moreover, we feel that our persistence to speak about
the precise moment at which this outcome is becoming
defined is ill-suited to the situation.7 Positioning and or-
dering of the events in time might be a problematic con-
cept itself if there is no flow of information that could
provide synchronization. Particularly, ordering of the
subjective perceptions might only have sense if these are
correlated. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the ”col-
lapse causes consciousness” interpretation (one where the
friend’s subjective experience does not exist for Wigner in
between t1 and t3 and then emerges at t3, while he him-
self subjectively continually perceives living through this
period) and the ”perception of future” interpretation (in
which the friend perceives the outcome ”from the future”
and Wigner is able to attribute continuous perception to
his friend in between t1 and t2) - are not essentially dif-
ferent. There seems to be a mathematical equivalence of
the two interpretations and, from our understanding, it
points to a deeper relation between time and subjective
experience - a connection beyond our present understand-
ing.
Finally, let us address the important issue of objectiv-
ity of the ”facts of the world”. The acknowledged subjec-
tivity of the collapse in (some of) presented views should
not be confused with impossibility to assign universal
Boolean values about the statements on (subjective) ob-
servations of different agents. With a (partial) exception
6 We dismiss possible objection that Wigner could artificially en-
gineer friend’s future memories to bring contradiction with his
”prophetic” perceptions, as requiring too many assumptions
about the connection of the brain and subjective perception.
But, if pressed to comment on this possibility, we point that
this very inability of the friend to communicate the result, en-
ables him to perceive - without contradiction - whatever future
will become compatible with Wigner’s meddling.
7 Vaguely, this resembles the situation when Alice and Bob are
space-like separated, share an equally polarized pair of entan-
gled photons and both measure the polarization along the same
axis: depending on the relative motion of the frame of reference,
either Alice outcome will be random and Bob’s predefined, or
the other way around. The comparison here is only insofar as to
remind that quantum mechanics often leads to counterintuitive
situations regarding time and certanity/chance.
of the ”no objective consciousness” sub-interpretation,
the other two options are more about temporal relativ-
ity of the subjective experience. Note that in none of
the proposed (sub)interpretations are there any contra-
dicting perceptions of the observers: conflicting outcomes
that cannot be allowed to coexist indeed do not coexist.
Thus it seems logically safe to take the subjective per-
ceptions of agents as ”the facts of the world” which are
independent of the observers.8
Next we will discuss some of the more delicate aspects
of our explanation(s) and some of the potential objections
to it.
V. ”WHEN” AND ”WHO” OF THE COLLAPSE
The mystery of ”when does the collapse occur?” is
likely the most profound and elusive of questions in quan-
tum mechanics, at least of those that can be put into
a simple sentence. Answering this question relies also
on answering of ”what causes the collapse”. Physics
has matured past the expectations that trivial (at least
philosophically) explanations can be given to these co-
nundrums, so we cannot be expected to pull off some
miracle either.
Yet, what seems to be maybe the most fascinating and
puzzling aspect of this question, is the apparent symme-
try and arbitrariness of the answer, that mobility of the
position of Heisenberg’s cut in the von Neuman’s chain.
It is this curious property that allows for so many vastly
different interpretations of quantum mechanics, including
the variants of subjective collapse approaches. A general
agreement upon this exists at least as long as we do not
consider ”encapsulated observers” cases (of the Wigner’s
friend type). However, the authors of [2, 3] explicitly
insisted that ”subjective collapse” interpretations break
down when faced with ”encapsulated observers” type of
thought experiments. Contrary to that, we have shown
above a number of such (sub)interpretations that pose no
contradiction even in this type of gedanken experiments.
Ostensibly it looks that the approaches we proposed
rely heavily on existence of ”subject” in the course of
analysis, and that the trouble of defining eligible ”sub-
ject” can lead to complications. Related is the problem
of defining ”whose” an experiment is, as we insisted that
one should calculate the predictions exclusively assum-
ing the appropriate point of view. Nevertheless, none of
these is a true problem exactly due to impossibility to
objectively assign who or what possesses the subjective
experience, and who or what does not. There is an arbi-
trariness of decision to watch anything from the outside
and see it as a quantum-mechanical clockwork device,
or to assume existence of subjective experience and to
8 Of course, we here consider only sane, rational subjective per-
ceptions.
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deduce these inner perception outcomes.
For example, in the contemplated Wigner’s experi-
ment, we have already discussed possibility that the
friend is not a sentient being, even replacing him with
a mere photon. Regardlessly, Wigner obtains the same
predictions about his interference experiment. He may,
in addition, attribute quality of the subjective perception
to his friend (was he a human, an animal, a computer,
or even the photon) and if he does so, he can accurately
predict what this subjective perception in the end will be
- to the extent that his prediction can be corroborated by
his friend (if the latter can give his subjective account of
the events). Yet, never he can objectively prove whether
his assumption to grant his friend the qualia of subjectiv-
ity made sense or not. And this inability certainly does
not influence any objective prediction.
It is more intricate to consider a replacement for the
Wigner. We can replace him with some elaborate device,
and assume that the machinery was devised and put into
action by Wigner’s friend himself, prior to his isolation in
the box. Since it is, to the best of our ability to name the
things, now the friend the ”one that performs the experi-
ment”, should not the fact that he subjectively perceives
the spin outcome alter the conclusions and change the
probability of W- interference outcome? Not in the least.
Subjectiveness of the interference measurement reflects
only in the moment when the friend decides to learn the
outcome of the interference measurement. If both of the
outcomes W+ and W- were possible (i.e. with nonzero
probabilities), the friend would subjectively collapse this
superposition. Up to that moment, the delicate ”Wigner
device” merely gets entangled with the system in the box,
and with the quantum machinery of friend’s brain, and
gets into a superposition prone to later collapse by the
friend’s measurement (the fact that probability of one of
the outcomes here is zero is inessential). Let us analyse
in some more detail how the Wigner’s friend would, at
time t0, see the events to come: ”At t1 my spin measure-
ment apparatus within the box and my brain will get
correlated with the particle spin. At t2, a device named
Wigner that I’ve prepared earlier and that stays outside
of the box will carry out a routine called ’interference
measurement’. Its two-state output register, with possi-
ble values W+ and W-, will get correlated with the entire
system in the box, including my brain. A priori, there
are four outcome possibilities: I perceive spin up and
then at t3 find the register in the W+ state, I perceive
spin up and the register in the W- state, and the two
corresponding possibilities with the spin down. When I
use quantum mechanics to calculate probabilities of these
particular outcomes, I get that the probability of W- in
either case is zero, while the other two probabilities split
into equal parts.” (Note that the precise moment t3 is
not essential here.)
One could object that if the friend repeats his analysis
and calculation in what he subjectively perceives as time
between t1 and t2, he might conclude ”I’ve just seen a
well defined single outcome of (e.g.) spin up and thus
the Wigner device measurement that will take place at
t2 should result in W+ or W- with equal probabilities”.
But this is again the same false paradox and necessary
illusion of the Wigner’s friend that, as we pointed out
earlier, any unitarity respecting interpretation (including
MW and DBB) must entail. The mistake is the result of
failure to properly account for all relevant elements of the
entire system.
What if we replace both Wigner and his friend with
some machinery? Would there ever be a collapse? Does
it make sense, and is there any necessity to attribute
consciousness to this unspecified machinery? Now that
is pure philosophy and metaphysics. At any rate, to get
any objective readout and to discuss anything, we must
involve a subjective experiencer at some point.
Indeed, it is weird but true that a ”single” subjective
experiencer (whatever that would mean) is, mathemati-
cally at least, enough to account for any objective mea-
surement outcome. Thus a common objection is that
”subjective collapse” approaches may lead to a solipsism
of a sort.9 Nevertheless, this is absolutely unnecessary
metaphysical direction, and thus a pointless objection.10
Finally, we must also mention, at least as a logical pos-
sibility, that in spite of the existing mathematical symme-
try between different observers and points of view, never-
theless there could exist a preferred ”frame of reference”,
one in which ”facts of the world” arise and are becom-
ing determined in a time-orderly way. While this idea
probably hurts our aesthetical feeling and does not bode
well with the Occam’s razor argument, it does have cer-
tain advantages. No longer there would be any trouble of
how to reconcile ”when” and ”who” of the collapse from
different perspectives. This informational frame of refer-
ence would then define the true reality, and the objective
collapse. Our subjective perceptions would then emerge
when the state of our brain becomes defined (actualized,
or collapsed) within this frame. After all, situations of
the Wigner’s friend type are maybe too artificial, or are at
least extremely rare, while apart from such cases the uni-
verse generally belongs to a single information-reference
frame: as far as we know there are no truly informa-
tionally isolated parts in the Universe, and it might be
that such a concept is for some reason unfeasible even in
principle.
Nonetheless, we personally think that such a symme-
try reduction is not truly necessary and that instead
9 As a curiosity, we mention an anecdote told by Coleman, that
pondering on the measurement problem inevitably led him even
to this option. He remarked to Aharonov his conclusion that
quantum mechanics indicates that it must be only him in the
Universe causing the collapse, and the latter replied with ”Tell
me, before you were born, could your father reduce the wave
packets?”
10 Instead, one could argue that this profound symmetry and ar-
bitrariness of the cut position rather points to the underlying
oneness of the subjective experiences, but we do not intend to
endeavor into metaphysical discussions.
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we should accept that there might be simply limits to
our intuitive understanding (itself too much bounded by
time-ordered thinking in terms of cause-and-effect) which
make difficult our attempts to comprehend this perplex-
ing symmetry.
To come to terms with this strange subjectivity and
symmetry of the collapse, and yet objectivity of the ”facts
of the world” proposed in these views, the following (al-
beit imperfect) analogy might help. We might imagine a
movie plot and that we are following the action. There
is a man, Wigner, in his laboratory, and there is a story
that goes on about the events there. Then a character
that was not there before appears in the scene - Wigner’s
friend. What was not told before about the friend, we
now find out and it is actually only now that this part
of the story becomes defined and ”real” - but only those
details that are shown in the movie, while the writer of
the script still has the freedom about the rest of it. The
movie is created and the plot is written as the camera
rolls.
Or we might film the entire scene letting the camera
follow the Wigner’s friend from the onset. Then he leaves
the box and the Wigner enters the scene, and every-
thing that was not fixed about the Wigner and his lab
by the earlier part of the movie now becomes defined,
and that part of the script written. The camera position
and movie directing are different, but the script (facts
of the world) in the end is the same, unique. To what
extent and whether the script is fixed and written in ad-
vance, or to what extent (more likely) we take part in
writing of the script as the story goes on - is rather a
metaphysical question out of the present scope. The or-
der in which the parts of the script are written does not
need to coincide with the time as experienced by any of
the characters in the movie, it might not even necessar-
ily be commensurable with the internal time in the movie
(e.g. if the friend decides to send an elaborate message
to Wigner in between t1 and t2, as envisaged by Deutsch
and discussed in details below, then this message-content
part of the script is for Wigner written and experienced
before the part about the spin orientation at t3, while
the friend experiences these two simultaneously).11 Per-
sonal awareness exists either only when the camera is in
our hands (”no objective consciousness”), or it can be
taken to arise subjectively for us also when we enter the
scene (”collapse causes consciousness”), or the characters
do have subjective experiences even when they are not
shown in the scene, but are being told, if necessary, some
future lines from the script (”perception of future”).
The view in which there is actually no true symme-
try of the observers (i.e. of the movie characters in the
analogy) is conceptually far simpler to put in the movie
11 Interestingly, the fact that the stories from different angles are
consistent, might be indicative of that the plot is being written
somehow jointly, or in some sense ”at one place”.
context. In that case there is only one, well defined cam-
era position (capturing most of the Universe), and the
script is being written as the plot evolves. The movie
shows the Wigner’s laboratory and the Wigner himself -
which Wigner ”feels” as being aware. On the contrary,
what happens with the Wigner’s friend is not decided
yet in the script, and there is objectively no subjective
experience of the friend at that time. At the moment the
friend jumps out of the box his part of the script has to
be written, with all the history of the events in the box,
which he then subjectively experiences as living through
these events.
Of course, we emphasise that the movie analogy is nei-
ther complete nor bounding (in the sense that the pro-
posed interpretation are sufficient without and indepen-
dent of philosophical connotations that the movie paral-
lels may bring).
VI. TROUBLES WITH SIGNALING
We offered the alternative explanation of the Wigner’s
thought experiment assuming that there is no informa-
tional ”leaking” from the friend’s isolated system (box).
But what if Wigner’s friend takes care that some trace of
his subjective experiences in the period after t1 is left in
the universe, i.e. by sending some deliberate meaningful
information?
Idea of signaling in a Wigner-like thought experiment
dates back at least to Deutsch proposal in [11]. He envi-
sioned that the person playing the role of Wigner’s friend
sends information on whether or not he obtained a single
outcome of the spin measurement. The idea was that
he is not sending any information about which of the
two possible outcomes of his experiment he obtained,
but merely the information whether he perceived a single
measurement outcome or maybe some sort of superposi-
tion of the outcomes.
As in [8], we believe that there is no any serious doubt
that Wigner’s friend can see anything but a clear single
outcome - as opposed to any sort of ”superposed mea-
surement result”. Despite the possible differences in un-
derstanding when the subjective experience occurs, i.e.
about when the content of these experiences is deter-
mined, we do not expect these ”later decided” experi-
ences to be qualitatively different from those ”normally
occurring” (i.e. in conditions of the normal flow of infor-
mation). More importantly, what Wigner’s friend ex-
periences when isolated in the box cannot depend on
whether he is subsequently measured in the interference
measurement byWigner or not (this is especially so in the
Deutsch and other interpretations in which experience
arises and is determined before the interference measure-
ment). If he is to perceive any superimposed or other-
wise unusual measurement result, than a similar effect
must befall any isolated observer upon any measurement
of a non-eigen state. As such measurements and obser-
vations are rather a rule than an exception, it is likely
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that any isolated observer would in that case see some
sort of blurred reality. If this idea is taken seriously, it
is quite unclear where such fuzziness would end - when
the information about the result reaches another human
being (but why then Wigner’s friend himself was not suf-
ficient?), a number of humans, or what?
Besides, isolation does not have to necessarily be in
the form of some closed surrounding as in an ”informa-
tion proof” box (which is hard to be practically realised)
- such an effect should in principle be also experienced
by anyone alone enough in the space: it would take time
equal to L/c for any information to reach the closest (rel-
evant) object (where L is distance to that object), and for
that time some of the observations would be ”blurred”.
This is obviously not recognized as a realistic peril of
the space travel, and we believe with a good reason (de-
pending on some further details, it is arguable that such
effect would have been already noticed during Appolo
missions).
Therefore: i) we certainly do not need to perform ex-
periment as elaborate as the Wigner’s friend one to rule
out possibility that the friend can see superimposed mea-
surement results - furthermore, we argue that it can al-
ready be ruled out; ii) possible message that Wigner’s
friend would send about seeing or not single reality thus
does not truly carry any information (i.e. it is an always-
the-same constant bit). From this viewpoint, sending
this bit of information by the Wigner’s friend is as good
as sending a uncorrelated predefined bit which cannot
change anything in the analysis.
And yet, not entirely. Let us say that Wigner’s friend
keeps to himself to deliberately choose the content of this
bit of data (instead of automatically having it set to the
constant which denotes ”I saw a well defined single out-
come”). Let’s also suppose that Wigner then performs
the interference experiment and obtains W- result, even
if his quantum control of Wigner’s friend system is ideal.
Would such a result now signal a breakdown of the uni-
tarity of quantum mechanics? No longer. It would in-
dicate the nonzero probability that friend nevertheless
decides to send the bit value correlated (or slightly cor-
related) with the spin orientation outcome that he mea-
sured. Maybe by a pure whim, he in the last minute
decides to use this bit of information to uncover the ob-
tained result. This is not same as a measurement error
- this effect must be there as the consequence of the free
will (or of what we perceive a such). If it was an au-
tomate or a deterministic computer instead od Winger’s
friend, this could not happen, but could the computer in-
form us if it subjectively perceived a single measurement
outcome? It could maybe be argued that the probabil-
ity of the friend not acting by the agreed rules could be
calculated (a posteriori) by Wigner who knows all details
about his friend’s brain and its functioning. Nevertheless,
it all introduces necessity for deeper and deeper assump-
tions about relation of the brain and subjective percep-
tion, of free will and computability. Are the free will
and existence of subjective experience compatible with
the determinism and computability? Should we go as
deep as to discuss possible relevance of the Goedel in-
completeness theorem? We feel that a physics discussion
should try to stay away from these matters, as long as it
is possible.
Thus far we believe to have shown that introduction of
this communicated bit between the friend and the Wigner
would not provide us any new insight about whether
or not superimposed measurement outcome can be ob-
served, but instead would introduce unwanted non zero
possibility of W- outcome, while relying on many ad hoc
assumptions about brain and consciousness.
However, reading Deutsch paper [11], one is left by
impression that question of whether the friend sees su-
perimposed reality is more of a rhetorical nature. It is
rather there to stress that the friend is obviously aware of
a single and only single outcome, and thus eligible to ap-
ply measurement update rule (i.e. to conclude that the
collapse happened). Deutsch conceives that the friend,
instead of sending a single bit, even elaborates on the
topic and writes: ”I, Professor X, F.R.S., hereby certify
that at time t”’ I have determined whether the value
of the North component of the spin of atom is +l/2 or
-1/2. At this moment I am contemplating in my own
mind one, and only one of those two values. In order
to facilitate the second part of this experiment, I shall
not reveal which one.” Such a complex message (written
deliberately by a human) really seems to leave no doubt
that consciousness, subjective experience and free will
(whatever is exact meaning of these notions and if they
can be objectively attributed to anyone at all) must have
been present and at work during the creative task of this
writing. But, can it be so certainly assumed that the par-
ticular obtained result (+1/2 or -1/2) cannot influence at
all contents of such a complicated message? At least by
a single detail, even subconsciously - and yet enough to
destroy the interference? If it was a deterministic com-
puter instead of a human such a risk would not exist,
but we are analysing the effects where a computer seems
not to be sufficient. Can we be sure that this human-vs-
computer aspect of the problem is only coincidental and
not indicating some limitation in principle? Again, pro-
ceeding further with this level of communication between
the encapsulated observers, forces us to imply certain ad
hoc assumptions on the consciousness and free will even
to a stronger extent than before. All cautions we consid-
ered when discussing a single bit message are only much
more pronounced in this case.
Note that, to the contrary, as long as the friend’s sys-
tem is absolutely isolated (there is no any information
flow outwards) and Wigner has the complete quantum
control over it, there is no limitation in principle for
Wigner to demonstrate complete impossibility of W- in-
terference result.12
12 For this it is also necessary that Wigner’s friend has no possibility
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Nonetheless, let us push forward and assume that
Wigner’s friend experiment can be carried out also in
presence of this type of communication between the
friend and Wigner (only at the cost of lesser ”interfer-
ence visibility”). What would be implications on our
”collapse causes consciousness” view?
The premise is then that the friend manages to send to
Wigner a meaningful message in between t1 and t2 which
is absolutely uncorrelated with the particular measure-
ment result. Then this aspect of the friend’s conscious-
ness is also absolutely unrelated (”untangled”) from the
obtained result and it indeed becomes real, determined
and subjectively experienced between t1 and t2. The
aspect of the subjective experience that pertains to the
explicit spin projection outcome still remains to be ”de-
cided” - and thus to become a part of subjective expe-
rience - only at t3. However, this does not mean that
Wigner’s friend has any unusual experience of contem-
plating about the message while having strange gaps in
his thoughts/perceptions. According to the premise, it
was only the particular spin outcome, and not the fact
or perception of its unique existence, that stayed uncor-
related with the sent message - we see no reason why
the latter could not be well defined without the former.
On the other hand, at t3 all the aspects of his subjec-
tive experience about the events from t1 to t2 are finally
determined/decided and his perception and recount of
the events has no sort of gaps. From his viewpoint ev-
erything would seem absolutely ordinary - he perceived
an outcome and wrote a message. Counterintuitive as it
may seem based on our usual assumptions on the con-
sciousness and subjective experience, we do not see any
actual contradiction in such an outline of the events.
Here a comparison to an artificially intelligent (quan-
tum) computer might even help: it is devisable that such
a machine could compose a message of the sort contem-
plated by Deutsch, in which the computer expresses the
fact that it has performed the measurement and got a sin-
gle result stored in a single bit memory register. It could
report in the message, in earnest, that it is ”contemplat-
ing within its registers one, and only one of those two
values” - as truthfully as it is possible. For, whichever
algorithm that can issue such a statement when only 0
or only 1 is written in this ”measurement outcome” reg-
ister, will detect no difference and will result in the same
output statement also when the register contains a super-
position of 0 and 1 - since, by the premise, the algorithm
output is not correlated with the value of the register.
Finally, receiving (i.e. measuring) such a message (by
Wigner) would collapse a certain number of registers - all
those involved in composing the message (which might be
in superposition if the algorithm is not entirely determin-
even to halt the experiment - otherwise, there is always some
possibility that he could decide to do that depending on the
outcome, which would in turn reflect on the probability of W-.
istic). However, since the register containing the result
was uncorrelated with the output message, its content
would stay in superposition.
One could object that now we are replacing the friend
with a computer, whereas we have already noted that va-
lidity of such replacement is tricky and dubious at best.
Yet, we did it for a number of reasons: i) to underline
once more that without considering friends subjective ex-
perience there is nothing strange, let alone paradoxical in
this thought experiment, ii) that even introducing issue
of subjective experience does not bring in any paradox
per se - it is also necessary to imply certain assumptions
about this subjective experience, in this particular case,
to imply that it must behave differently than a (quantum)
computer (in the sense to imply that subjective experi-
ence cannot be ”collapsed” partially, unlike the computer
registers), and iii) to help us by this analogy to accept
possibility of otherwise quite counterintuitive hypothesis.
Therefore, the signaling argument cannot invalidate
”collapse causes consciousness” view. The significance
of the message sent by the Wigner’s friend is even lesser
for ”no objective consciousness” interpretation. In this
view no subjective experience can be attributed to the
friend from the Wigner’s aspect. No matter how com-
plex is the message generated by the friend, it indicates
only his computational abilities and no underlying con-
sciousness. Part of his memory registers are collapsed
as the Wigner’s learns of the message content, but not
the register that stores the outcome of the spin measure-
ment. It makes no sense to consider what the friend has
subjectively perceived, and thus there is no paradox of
any sort.
The ”perception of future” interpretation is intuitively
least demanding to comprehend. All the time the friend
”really” sees the result and may ponder about it - it is
only that the result value does not pertain to the spin
alignment at t1, but at t3.
VII. A FEW WORDS ON EXTENDED
WIGNER’S FRIEND EXPERIMENT
For the sake of completeness we shall briefly consider
the ”Extended Wigner’s friend” experimental setup of
[1], although, by now, it should be clear what are our
positions also in this particular case. For the details of
the setup and the corresponding notation we refer to the
article [1].
Again, we will start by replacing ”Wigner friends” F1
and F2 with some simple quantum automata that un-
doubtedly undergo linear and unitary evolution. The
measurement outcomes of A and W are then beyond any
dispute, and no conflicting predictions can occur.
As before, paradoxical interpretations arise only when
we consider subjective experiences of the involved friends
F1 and F2. And again, we first consider the truly final
state of the experiment, after the complete decoherence
has occurred and all agents involved are within the same
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informationally connected reference system. This final
stage is necessary not only in any realistic experimental
setup, but also in principle, if the agents are to compare
the results and discuss their conclusions. Yet again, this
final stage, let it be at a moment t6, is ignored both in [1]
and in the subsequent replies, either by omission or by
some, surprising to us, tacit agrement on its irrelevance.
After this final decoherence, friends F1 and F2 end in
well defined brain states, either |head〉 or |tail〉, and ei-
ther |up〉 or |down〉, respectively, with all memories and
subjective impressions of one that has simply just mea-
sured these outcomes at respective times t1 and t2. It
is unavoidable that the friends will be confused by the
results of interference measurements of A and W, if they
look retrospectively and solely from their own perspec-
tives. Neither of the quantum mechanical interpretations
that respect universal unitarity can change this fact, and
neither finds anything deeply disturbing there. Alterna-
tively, both friends can correctly infer outcome probabil-
ities of interference experiments by assuming Wigner’s
and Assistant’s perspectives, and by accounting for all
the relevant information.
It is only insistence on existence of the subjective per-
ceptions of friends before moment t6 that can lead to in-
consistencies and to coexistence of conflicting outcomes
(like the coexistence of sharp values of otherwise non-
commuting observables). While again, there is no objec-
tive indication that the corresponding subjective percep-
tions of the measurement events at t1 and t2 ever existed
prior to t6, from the perspective of Wigner, his Assis-
tant and the final decohered system. As before, to avoid
the inconsistencies we can freely adopt one of the views:
i) these subjective perceptions were ”decided” and came
into existence at t6 from the W and A point of view,
ii) these subjective perceptions (somehow) simply do not
exist from the W and A viewpoints, and iii) these sub-
jective perceptions concurrently and continuously existed
even from the W and A perspectives, but these were per-
ceptions of the outcomes that would become defined at
t6.
A subtle difference between the extended Wigner’s ex-
periment and the original one is that the subsequent mea-
surements of Wigner and his Assistant this time do alter
the quantum states of the friends’ isolated subsystems.
However, apart from obscuring problems related to un-
motivated flip of the friend’s subjective perception, we
do not see any larger impact of this difference to our
conclusions.
VIII. COMPARISON WITH OTHER VIEWS
We have offered three interpretations - ones we dubbed
”consciousness causes collapse”, ”no objective conscious-
ness” and ”perception of future” - which all have in com-
mon negating the very existence, from the Wigner’s point
of view, of the friend’s subjective perception of the t1
measurement outcome in between of t1 and t2. All three
can be seen as ”sub-interpretations” of the Copenhagen
interpretation with subjective collapse where the subjec-
tivity of the collapse is applied consistently and to the
full extent. To our knowledge these views do not coin-
cide with any of the commonly known interpretations of
quantum mechanics. On the other hand, in the termi-
nology of [3], they all correspond to the same mathemat-
ical formalism that is also shared by many-worlds, De-
Broigle Bohm, QBism, Rovelli’s and Copenhagen’s in-
terpretation (as well as by any other unitarity-respecting
interpretation). Namely, predictions of all these interpre-
tations match in all objectively measurable aspects: they
all predict both that Wigner’s interference measurement
would yield W+ and that Wigner’s friend later recount of
events would describe simply seeing a single outcome de-
fined at t3. Above we have intentionally included Copen-
hagen’s interpretation in the list since, in spite of not
being conclusively defined, we find it more in the spirit
of Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s ideas to put it here than to
interpret it as mechanistic-collapse theory as the authors
seem to have implied in [OC2].13
The symmetry of different observers expounded in sec-
tion V may resemble relativity of information-reference
systems of the Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics.
For more detailed comparison, we again turn to the anal-
ysis of the Wigner’s friend experiment elaborated in [8].
We agree with Brukner that the view he presented in de-
tail there has much in common, in the first place, with
the Rovelli’s interpretation. In absence (to our knowl-
edge) of sources in literature that scrutinize specifically
Wigner’s proposed experiment from the perspective of
this school of thought, we thus take that its view would
follow Brukner’s in most of the main aspects.
Both the approach of [8] and the ones we advocate
agree about the following tenets: firstly, postulates I and
II must be preserved, and, secondly, the definite outcome
of the spin measurement and the sharp value of W+ inter-
ference outcome cannot coexist in the usual sense. From
these premises Brukner derives that ”there are no facts
of the world”, but he does not deny (at least not in an
obvious manner) the very existence of concurrent sub-
jective perception of the Wigner’s friend in between of t1
and t2 from the Wigner’s point. Instead, he never seems
to doubt (not even from the Wigner’s perspective) that
at the (absolute time) moment t1 the friend really per-
ceives a single outcome - it is more that the outcome, i.e.
the observer’s record, should be meaningless ”per se” and
attains significance only relative to the observer, that is,
to the corresponding environment. As clarified in [9], it
is the problem of ”jointly assigning truth values to the
propositions about observed outcomes” (italic added by
us), not denying the very existence of the observed out-
comes. This is also how we understand, for example, the
statement [8]: ”If we respect that there are no preferred
13 We understand that Brukner in [8] shares this sentiment with us.
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observers, then there is no reason to assume that the
’facts’ of one of them are more fundamental than those
of the other. But then, the observers’ records cannot
be comprised of ’facts of the world’, independent of the
”environment” in which they have occurred.” - namely,
that the ’facts’ are there, that the records have indeed
”occurred”, but they are meaningless when taken inde-
pendently of the ”environment”. It further seems that
the author ([8] page 20) accepts - due to the evidence in
the form of message - that the ”observer had the perfect
knowledge about A1” (i.e. about the spin outcome) prior
to the interference measurement (which means also from
the Wigner’s viewpoint, as he is the one that receives the
message!), and implies, in parenthesis, that the observer
forgets this outcome afterwards.14 If this is so, then we
encounter the problem, already mentioned, of the final
observer’s memory of the outcome ”gained” at t3. This
one might (in one half of the cases) turn out to be dif-
ferent from the one he has just forgot. Yet, what then
induces this occasional flip, if the interference measure-
ment itself leaves the state of the observer (i.e. the friend)
intact? There is another subtle unusual aspect of allow-
ing the final memory determined at t3 to be different from
the one occurring at t1: the friend ”lives through” expe-
rience corresponding to the memory obtained at t1, while
the ”final” memory he only experiences as the past one
and has never ”felt it” as unfolding in the present time.
Or, maybe he subjectively ”lived through” both, which is
again unusual? Of course, both of these problematic as-
pects are not of ”objective nature”, in the sense that the
friend after t3 (when he is finally able to give his account
of the events) can no longer tell the difference - neither
he knows if the flip has occurred or not, nor he can tell
if he ever felt this final outcome as ”unfolding” in real
time (looking retrospectively, memory in both cases feels
genuine and the same). Nevertheless, note that both of
these philosophical problems arise relative to a single ob-
server (or environment), and thus cannot be avoided by
referencing to relativity of ”facts” of different observers.
Unfortunately, Brukner himself did not in [8, 9] consider
the moment t3 of the final decoherence so that our above
interpretation of the text might be prone to misunder-
standing.
To the contrary of Brukner, as already stated, we do
not maintain that our proposed approach has a prob-
lem to establish ”facts of the world”. It is only that we
assume properties of the phenomenon of subjective ex-
perience (related in particular to its temporal relativity)
different from those commonly attributed to it (neither
former nor the latter are so far independently proved and
probably even cannot be). Depending upon the chosen
14 The impression is additionally reinforced by the comparison
made on page 23 with a double slit experiment in which, accord-
ing to the relational interpretation, electron should be supposed
to ”know” which path it took during the interference measure-
ment.
sub-interpretation, Wigner can even answer, in a consis-
tent way, the question of the current subjective experi-
ence of his friend: either this experience i) emerges only
at t3, or ii) never, or iii) it concurrently unfolds, but that
of the outcome that will be decided only at t3. In any
of the cases, there is no coexistence of conflicting per-
ceptions, and thus nothing that precludes us to attribute
general - i.e. objective - truth values to the corresponding
propositions. We think that this is a very clear distinc-
tion of our interpretations from the Brukner and Rovelli’s
views.
In turn, we find that our proposals contradict the state-
ment of the no-go theorem of the paper [9], as they
satisfy all four of the theorem propositions. The logi-
cal explanation we see in the fact that the proof of the
theorem implicitly used certain assumptions about the
subjective experience - in particular that Wigner’s friend
perception of t1 outcome certainly exist in between t1
and t2 from Wigner’s viewpoint (taking the message the
Wigner receives as a sufficient proof of that). The va-
lidity of the no-go theorem can be restored if it is ex-
tended with a proposition similar to the following: ”5.
’Strong emergent-consciousness hypothesis’. Every state
of a functioning brain, even when in superposition, gives
rise to the corresponding subjective experience”.
Of the very concrete differences in the example of the
Wigner’s friend, we stress that [8] i) presupposes exis-
tence of something (friend’s definite t1 outcome percep-
tion) that never leaves a trace in the Universe and thus
cannot be objectively confirmed that had existed and ii)
this something then undergoes a sudden flip at an unclear
moment and without a convincing cause. Conversely, a
in all three of our views, there is never, from Wigner’s
perspective, subjective perception of a well defined spin
projection pertaining to time between t1 and t2, nor is
there ever any flip in the friend’s memory/experience.
Of all our sub-interpretations, we acknowledge that
there is indeed significant similarity of the ”no objec-
tive consciousness” sub-interpretation with the QBism
views on the Wigner’s friend experiment. The latter is
expounded with great clarity by Fuchs and Stacey in [7].
Yet, while the QBism seems to take an agnostic view in
this regard and to insist that quantum mechanics should
not attempt to ”pierce the other agents personal expe-
rience”, we see the ”no objective consciousness” concept
as a specific trait of the subjective experience per se, not
as the mere inability of quantum mechanics to account
for it. Besides, apart from this sort of ”agnosticism”, in
[7] we do not find anything that would unambiguously
indicate doubting that the very subjective perception of
friend about the outcome exists from the Wigner’s per-
spective. Unfortunately, the authors of [7] also do not
consider the final decoherence at t3, nor they discuss the
fact that interference measurement need not alter the
state of the isolated system at all - for these would cer-
tainly further clarify the parallels and the differences of
the interpretations.
As the presented views correspond to Copenhagen in-
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terpretation with subjective collapse, it makes sense also
to compare them with the no-collapse interpretations,
in particular with the Everet’s relative state viewpoint.
Namely, if the collapse is only subjective, does it mean
that ”objectively” the wave function never collapses, and
that thus all terms in a superposition, no matter that
they did not actualize from our viewpoint, must be kept
and that we must attribute ontological existence to them?
Indeed, when we analysed the Wigner’s gedanken exper-
iment from the viewpoint of the friend, we ascertained
that he must assume Wigner’s perspective to correctly
predict the outcome of the interference measurement. If
he, in between of t1 and t2 in his subjective time ref-
erence, upon seeing the result, supposes that the wave
function has objectively collapsed, he will get wrong pre-
dictions for the W+/W- measurement. Does this imply
that there is never any state reduction, for there can al-
ways be some external observer?
In our opinion, this is not a necessity. Namely, keep-
ing the ”unobserved” terms is relevant for making correct
predictions only as long as there are external observers
or external experimental setups that make these terms
relevant. In the above example, if there was no Wigner
or Wigner-device outside of the box, capable and pre-
pared to measure the W+/W- interference, the collapse
observed by the friend might have been not only sub-
jective but also objective. The friend might not know
whether there is or there is not such a ”Wigner” outside,
but the Universe ”knows”. This becomes more natural
if one adopts a view that there exists a reality, defined
only to certain extent (insomuch to be in agreement with
all the ”collapsed” classical information), of which our
subjective experiences are only particular perspectives,
while the laws of quantum mechanics merely enable us
to calculate probabilities of what the reality in the next
moment might look like. These subjective experiences
then take the role of the ”facts of the world”, while the
wave function in such a view does not have ontic exis-
tence - it is just a mathematical tool that helps calculate
future predictions based on previous outcomes. Thus as
soon as the need to keep certain terms of this mathe-
matical tool definitely ceases, we may very well discard
them and take that as an ”objective collapse”. Or, more
correctly stated, there was never anything to discard, as
the wave-function never truly existed in the first place
- it is just that nobody any more needs these particu-
lar terms in his calculation and never will. We empha-
sise that such a collapse is then objective, but not in
the sense of a ”mechanical-collapse” which is induced by
nonlinear/nonunitary evolution (and thus why we made
the distinction in the first place).
This line of reasoning could be elaborated further, in
a natural way. As the evolution between the moments
of reality (which correspond to measurements in a broad
sense) is unitary and deterministic, it introduces no new
information into reality. In this sense, to calculate uni-
tary evolution is a calculation of ”what happens when
nothing new happens”. New information emerges at the
point of collapse - i.e. of the actualization of reality, with
higher probability for those outcome-realities with lesser
amount of new information.15 This appearance of new
information, as opposed to overall constancy of the total
amount of information in no-collapse interpretations, is a
hallmark of (non deterministic) objective collapse mod-
els. The same feature we find e.g. in QBist views, as eluci-
dated by Fusch and Stacey in [7]: ”With the action of the
agent upon the system, the no-go theorems of Bell and
KochenSpecker assert that something new comes into the
world that wasnt there previously: It is the outcome, the
unpredictable consequence for the very agent who took
the action.” Maybe the most notable proponent of sim-
ilar views was John Archibald Wheeler, to whom is at-
tributed the following statement which well summarizes
the idea: each elementary quantum phenomenon is an
elementary act of fact creation ”. Indeed, our views here
resonate also well with his stance that ”the observations
of all the participators, past, present and future, join to-
gether to define what we call reality” [12] and with some
other tenets of his ”participatory universe” interpreta-
tion. However, we stress that this or any other metaphys-
ical extension is by no means necessary for the remainder
of the paper.
IX. CONCLUSION
The analysis presented here we started by showing that
the series of papers [1–4], somewhat in between the lines
but still without any doubt, effectively disqualifies the
standard, i.e. Copenhagen interpretation as a valid ap-
proach to QM. Endeavor to find the real roots of these
arguments inevitably led us to the phenomenon of sub-
jective experience.
This should not come to much of a surprise, since the
inspiration for Wigner to devise his though experiment,
which lies in heart of the listed papers, in the first place
was exactly to point to the consciousness as the final
frontier where the collapse postulate should be invoked.
(However, this led him into direction of mechanical-
objective collapse caused by the consciousness, with all
hurdles such an idea brings along.) Many other expla-
nations in the literature also revolve around or close to
the notion of subjective experience, but mostly fail, or
intentionally avoid, to clearly put a finger on it.16
15 Logicall for this view would be also to seek understanding of ele-
mentary particles not as something well described by the unitary
irreducible representations of some total symmetry (super)group,
but in which the particles are these representations. For, irre-
ducible representations can be seen as the tiniest, unbreakable,
”irreducible” pieces of information that can exist in a Universe
with given symmetries.
16 We can not help getting impression that sometimes authors, in
an attempt to stay ”rational”, irrationally try to avoid the word
”consciousness” or anything that sounds alike. However, we must
not forget that ”being rational” entails looking for the simplest
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The other key observation we made was about impor-
tance of the, generally overlooked, moment of the final
decoherence t3 - which gave us insight into the only ob-
jective indication of the Wigner friend’s subjective expe-
rience in this setup. Recognizing that, according to any
of the unitarity respecting interpretations of QM, he will
certainly have at least one subjective recollection of the
spin measurement (and the one that anyhow seems in-
compatible with the interference measurement results),
we naturally casted a doubt about the very existence of
the other, earlier subjective experience of the same mea-
surement, the one which is in addition conflicting and
unsubstantiated.
It turned out that the conclusions coming from such
line of reasoning are absolutely compatible with the stan-
dard QM postulates, landing a welcome support for the
challenged Copenhagen interpretation (by this, in our
eyes, we justified the title of this paper). Moreover, such
approach enables us to keep notion of ”facts of the world”
in conjunction with the standard postulates of quantum
mechanics - a result expected to be impossible by some
of the authors [9]. On the other hand, the price of these
new views is a necessity to reexamine our assumptions
about the nature of the subjective experience itself.
In particular, we have proposed three novel pos-
sible answers to the problem of the friend’s subjec-
tive perception of the spin outcome (prior to the in-
terference measurement), all of which can be seen
as ”sub-interpretations” of the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion with subjective collapse. We dubbed these sub-
interpretations: ”collapse causes consciousness”, ”no ob-
jective consciousness” and ”perception of future”. Each
of them implies some different properties of the subjec-
tive experience phenomenon. Obviously thus, the new
interpretations rely on these corresponding hypotheses
about consciousness.
But, the less obvious and generally overlooked fact is
that also all of the other interpretations rely on their,
tacitly accepted assumptions about consciousness.17 In
this sense, we did not introduce any more of unproved
assumptions about the elusive phenomenon of subjective
experience than any other interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, it is only that premises that some of the standard
interpretations are based upon are taken for granted and
thus pass without notice. As we already pointed out,
in the context of Wigner’s friend (but also in a more
general context) it is common to presuppose that subjec-
tive experience is a mere byproduct of the calculations
performed in the brain, and furthermore, that this even
holds for a brain in a quantum-mechanical superposition
and the most explanatory answer, wherever that takes us, and
not necessarily for the one that ”sounds rational” by the present
standards.
17 Furthermore, based on these unspoken assumptions, certain au-
thors, e.g. in [1, 11] try to invalidate some of established quantum
mechanical interpretations, CI among the rest.
(what we named the ”strong emergent-consciousness hy-
pothesis”).
In truth, not only that these implied assumptions are
not proven, but, due to the subjective character of sub-
jective experience, it is quite possible that such asser-
tions are in principle impossible to objectively prove18.
In the terminology of quantum physics, the confronting
views on the nature and causes of subjective experience
that appear in cognitive science are therefore more like
different interpretations of consciousness, in the sense in
which different ontological views on quantum mechanics
with the same experimental predictions we call different
interpretations.
In this view, our goal is to show that, instead of in-
validating certain interpretations of quantum mechan-
ics, Wigner’s friend thought experiment points to a link
between interpretations of quantum mechanics and of
cognitive science, in the sense that some interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics are compatible only with
certain interpretations and assumptions related to the
nature of subjective experience. For example, the
many world interpretation relies on the above ”strong
emergent-consciousness hypothesis”, DBB interpretation
requires basic emergent-consciousness hypothesis but
with a caveat that the wave-function of the brain is itself
insufficient to give raise to subjective perception, Rov-
elli and Brukner’s interpretation seem to require emer-
gent hypothesis but in a way related to ”no facts of the
world” dictum - which needs further clarification, QBism
is mostly agnostic according to [7], whereas each of our
three proposed interpretations goes hand in hand with
the corresponding specific assumptions about conscious-
ness that we already discussed at length. In addition, all
of the interpretations that are related to subjective col-
lapse view (Rovelli’s, Brukner’s, QBism and these pre-
sented here) are dependent or are at least deeply con-
nected with the ”other mind” conundrum - the impossi-
bility in principle to objectively prove existence of subjec-
tive experience of any agent/thing. All these connections,
best manifested through the Wigner’s friend experiment,
implicate that the fundamental problems of quantum me-
chanics and fundamental question about phenomenon of
subjective experience seem to be deeply related and in-
separable, so that proper approach would be to treat
them jointly.
As a side note of this analysis, we comment that (con-
trary to some expressed opinions, e.g. in [2]) actual real-
18 For the perspective on related open problems in cognitive sci-
ence we suggest getting informed with the discussions related
to Chinese room argument, Mary’s room, sufficiency of Turing’s
test for inferring existence of consciousness, and alike. As the
physicists generally seem to be quite unaware of these problems,
so the cognitive science researches seem to be mostly equally un-
aware of the quantum mechanics and its possible relation to their
field - at least judged by a very few hits an Internet search for
combination ”Chinese room” and ”quantum mechanics” yields.
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ization of the Wigner’s friend thought experiment is not
a prerequisite to differentiate between any of the quan-
tum mechanical interpretations. Namely, to summarize
previously drawn conclusions: predictions of mechanical-
collapse models, if right, would have to show up in much
much simpler experiments; all other interpretations share
the same formalism and thus agree on Wigner’s thought
experiment outcomes, which includes also the variants
with communication between Wigner and his friend19.
In addition, possibility that the friend would subjectively
experience any sort of blurred or superposed reality can
be also dismissed, even experimentally if need be, far
more easily than by carrying out the entire Wigner’s ex-
periment. Thus, performing the experiment in reality
likely would not provide us with any new insight into
quantum mechanics. This is to much of our relief, as it
would have been very disappointing that such deep and
important understandings hinge upon a feat we are so
unlikely to ever perform.
In the concluding remark, we would like to give a sort
of disclaimer that should accompany all of the papers on
the Wigner’s friend subject and alike. Namely, all of the
reasoning in such papers, including in this one, is based
on the premise that experiments of this type are in princi-
ple possible. It is not inconceivable that there could exist
some essential limitations which would preclude this type
of experiments altogether: either regarding the required
ideal informational isolation, or regarding necessary con-
nection of the brain-state reading with the subjective ex-
perience, or even regarding the specific combination of
the two. If so, that would probably void all of the con-
clusions derived in these analyses. However, in that case,
discovering these limitations would be of a great value for
understanding of quantum mechanics, subjective experi-
ence or both. Ergo, over a half a century after Wigner
devised his thought experiment, it remains a great and
inspiring theoretical tool for probing not only the quan-
tum mysteries, but also those related to the subjective
perception phenomenon.
19 As we have discussed when considering effects of the messages
sent by the friend, experiments that include signalling could bear
nontrivial implications on understanding of the brain functioning
and its relation to probabilities of agent decisions. However, such
understanding is rather a prerequisite to carry out the Wigner’s
experiment, and not the knowledge that we could gain from it.
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